Some papers:
'Recent work on first-person thought' (with Léa Salje), (forthcoming in Analysis).
'Accidentally about me', (forthcoming in Mind).
'About vs Concerns', in B. Ball and C. Schuringa (eds.) The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge Contemporary , 2019: 162-183.
'Temporal indexicals are essential', Analysis, 79 (3) (2019): 452-461.
'Thinking about the body as subject', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49 (4) (2019): 435-457.
'Addiction and powerlessness' (short piece for the Institute of Art and Ideas, April 2018).
'Impersonal intentions', Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271)(2018): 376-384.
‘Self-notions and top-down distortion’, Inquiry 60 (3) (2017): 277-294.
‘Getting out of your head: addiction and the motive of self-escape’ (with Lucy O’ Brien), Mind and Language 31 (3) (2016): 314-334.
‘The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1795-1811.
'Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se?', in S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 104-124.
‘Can you think my “I”-thoughts?’, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234) (2009): 68-85.
'Recent work on first-person thought' (with Léa Salje), (forthcoming in Analysis).
'Accidentally about me', (forthcoming in Mind).
'About vs Concerns', in B. Ball and C. Schuringa (eds.) The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge Contemporary , 2019: 162-183.
'Temporal indexicals are essential', Analysis, 79 (3) (2019): 452-461.
'Thinking about the body as subject', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49 (4) (2019): 435-457.
'Addiction and powerlessness' (short piece for the Institute of Art and Ideas, April 2018).
'Impersonal intentions', Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271)(2018): 376-384.
‘Self-notions and top-down distortion’, Inquiry 60 (3) (2017): 277-294.
‘Getting out of your head: addiction and the motive of self-escape’ (with Lucy O’ Brien), Mind and Language 31 (3) (2016): 314-334.
‘The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1795-1811.
'Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se?', in S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 104-124.
‘Can you think my “I”-thoughts?’, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234) (2009): 68-85.