Some papers:
'Thinking about the Body as Subject' (forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy).
'Addiction and Powerlessness' (short piece for the Institute of Art and Ideas, April 2018).
'Impersonal Intentions', Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271)(2018): 376-384.
‘Self-notions and top-down distortion’, Inquiry 60 (3) (2017): 277-294.
‘Getting out of your head: addiction and the motive of self-escape’ (with Lucy O’ Brien), Mind and Language 31 (3) (2016): 314-334.
‘The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1795-1811.
'Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se?', in S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 104-124.
‘Can you think my “I”-thoughts?’, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234) (2009): 68-85.
'Thinking about the Body as Subject' (forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy).
'Addiction and Powerlessness' (short piece for the Institute of Art and Ideas, April 2018).
'Impersonal Intentions', Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271)(2018): 376-384.
‘Self-notions and top-down distortion’, Inquiry 60 (3) (2017): 277-294.
‘Getting out of your head: addiction and the motive of self-escape’ (with Lucy O’ Brien), Mind and Language 31 (3) (2016): 314-334.
‘The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1795-1811.
'Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se?', in S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 104-124.
‘Can you think my “I”-thoughts?’, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234) (2009): 68-85.